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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
NEW YORK PRACTICE-REARGUMENT PERMITTED ON TENANT'S
ALLEGED WAIVER OF LANDLORD'S COMPLIANCE WITH COVENANT.-
On March 1, 1953, plaintiff-corporation leased certain premises to
defendant-corporation and agreed to obtain a requisite certificate of
occupancy from the City of New York. The lease provided that de-
fendant would be permitted to vacate if plaintiff, after having ex-
hausted all remedies, was unable to obtain the certificate. Almost
fourteen months after the signing of the lease, defendant gave plain-
tiff written notice that if the certificate of occupancy was not forth-
coming by June 30, 1954, it would consider the lease terminated. The
certificate was not obtained until July 8. On June 30, defendant
vacated and refused to pay further rent. The Court held that the
issuance of the certificate was merely delayed and not refused. The
concurring opinion of Judge Fuld was based solely on the ground
that defendant waived its right to demand timely compliance with
plaintiff's promise to obtain the certificate by giving written notice.,
A motion for leave to reargue the question of the defendant's waiver
of demand for timely compliance with the plaintiff's covenant con-
cerning the certificate was granted. 56-70 58th St. Holding Corp. v.
Fedders-Quigan Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 878, 160 N.E.2d 124, 188 N.Y.S.2d
995, aff'd, 6 N.Y.2d - (1959).
It is difficult to determine exactly why the Court of Appeals
granted reargument in this case.
A motion for reargument is generally an act of desperation; it is a
psychological device for raising hopes which are almost invariably doomed
to defeat. The percentage of cases in which a motion for reargument has
been granted in the Court of Appeals is very low-unquestionably, less than
one out of one hundred.2
Whether a motion for reargument should be granted is left to
the discretion of the court which rendered the decision on which
reargument is desired.3 Reargument will be granted where it can
be shown that the court overlooked or misapprehended some prin-
ciple of law that could be controlling in the case.4 Where it can be
shown that great public interest is involved in the problem, the court
156-70 58th St. Holding Corp. v. Fedders-Quigan Corp., 5 N.Y.2d 557,
159 N.E.2d 150, 186 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1959).
2 COHEN & KARGER, PowERs OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS § 186,
at 694 (rev. ed. 1952).
3 Ellis v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 198 Misc. 912, 102 N.Y.S.2d
337 (Sup. Ct. 1951); People v. Kelley, 178 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Ct. Gen. Sess.
1958).
4 N.Y. CT. APP. RULE XX. See, e.g., Hamilton Park Builders Corp. v.
Rogers, 4 Misc. 2d 269, 156 N.Y.S.2d 891 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (overlooked);
Nicholas v. Drew, 21 Hun 109 (Sup. Ct. 1880); People v. Dellamura,
28 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Kings County Ct. 1941) (misapprehended); Matter of
Crane, 81 Hun 96, 30 N.Y. Supp. 616 (Sup. Ct. 1894). See generally COHEN
& KARGER, op. cit. szpra note 2, § 186.
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will also entertain this motion.5 Supervening and inconsistent United
States Supreme Court decisions, 6 as well as occasions where the ma-
jority of the New York Court of Appeals does not agree in a given
case heard by only six judges,7 will justify the granting of a motion
to reargue. Previously, it had been thought that this motion would
not lie in a case that had already been remitted by the Court of
Appeals to a lower court, and subsequently acted upon by the lower
court. Today it is generally accepted that the Court of Appeals can
recall a remittitur from the lower court at any time for the purpose
of reargument.8
Reargument will not be permitted where its sole purpose is to
circumvent the statute of limitations, nor as a rule, where there is
still remedy by appeal. 9 Noncompliance with the formal requirements
in requesting reargument can result in its denial.10 Usually, the
courts will not entertain, new facts as the grounds for granting a
reargument, but will consider only the evidence already introduced."
At least one important exception to this rule can be found; new
evidence is permitted in capital offenses where the sentence of death
has been imposed.' 2
5United States of Mexico v. Schmuck, 293 N.Y. 768, 57 N.E.2d 845
(1944) (memorandum decision). "The general rule that reargument will not
be granted in order to afford a party opportunity to submit questions of law
which he failed to submit upon the original arguments should not be strictly
applied where a sovereign State challenges the validity of its property." Ibid.
See People v. Regan, 292 N.Y. 109, 54 N.E.2d 508 (1944) (per curiam).6H. P. Hood & Sons v. Dumond, 300 N.Y. 480, 88 N.E.2d 661 (1949)
(memorandum decision); Mabee v. White Plains Co., 295 N.Y. 937, 68 N.E.2d
38 (1946) (memorandum decision). See also New York Cent. R.R. v.
Beacon Milling Co., 184 Misc. 187, 53 N.Y.S.2d 405 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
7See COHEN & KARGER, PowERs OF THE NEW YORK CoURT oF APPALs
§186 (rev. ed. 1952).
s COHEN & KARGER, op. cit. supra note 7, § 186. See H. P. Hood & Sons
v. Dumond, 299 N.Y. 794, 87 N.E.2d 687 (1949) (memorandum decision).
1 People v. Dellamura, 28 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Kings County Ct. 1941);
1 CARImODY-WAiT, CYCLOPEDIA OF NEV YORK PRAcricE 679-80 (1952).20 Ellis v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 198 Misc. 912, 102 N.Y.S.2d
337 (1951) (denied a motion for reargument brought without permission).
See Cook v. Gill, 285 N.Y. 780, 34 N.E.2d 919 (1941) (memorandum decision)(reargument granted after an error in filing was completed).
11 Lane v. Lane, 14 Misc. 2d 560, 182 N.Y.S.2d 603 (Sup. Ct. 1958). The
court in reviewing a motion for reargument, instead granted leave to renew
and reconsider. Public Serv. Comm'n v. Grand Cent. Cadillac Renting Corp.,
53 N.Y.S.2d 202 (Sup. Ct. 1944), rezld on other grounds, 273 App. Div. 595,
78 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1st Dep't 1944). Cf. In the Matter of Estate of Hooker,
173 Misc. 515, 18 N.Y.S.2d 107 (Surr. Ct. 1940).
12People v. Regan, 292 N.Y. 109, 54 N.E.2d 32 (1944) (per curiam).
Regan was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. The con-
viction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Regan then moved for a new
trial in the Court of General Sessions on the ground of newly discovered
evidence. The motion was denied. Regan then moved in the Court of Appeals
for reargument and for leave to submit new evidence. Motion was granted.
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Although the grant of motion for reargument is discretionary
with the court, the power cannot be arbitrarily exercised. If a judge
grants a motion for reargument upon insufficient grounds, it is error
which should and will be corrected by an appellate court whenever
the question is properly brought before it for review.
13
In the instant case the Court granted reargument "on the issue
of the tenant's alleged waiver of its right to demand timely compli-
ance by the landlord." 14 By following the normal rules of reargu-
ment it is difficult to understand just why the motion was granted.
Perhaps the Court, in construing the dependency of the covenants,
was confused by the two issues of waiver that pervade the case. 15
On the other hand, the Court may have desired merely to reconsider
its position.
To ascertain why the Court granted reargument, the substantive
background of the covenants must be examined. Where there is an
express assertion of the intent of the parties, there is little problem
discerning whether or not covenants are independent or dependent."
Difficulty presents itself, however, in situations where the parties to
a contract never thought to express their intentions as to the de-
pendency of respective covenants. The Court might return to the
theory held prior to Lord Mansfield's time, that unless the parties
to a bilateral agreement expressly set forth their intention to make
the covenants independent, mutual dependency would be attributed to
them.17  The modern trend is away from this approach. Today,
courts attempt to determine what the intentions of the parties would
have been at the time of the issuance of the contract had the parties
considered the problem. 18 Certain promises are so patently inde-
pendent that the ends of justice would not be served by construing
them otherwise. The same principle holds true for clearly dependent
covenants.' 9 In the instant case the three majority members of the
13 Danowitz v. Fero, 21 N.Y.S.2d 813 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1940) ; 1 CARNODY-
WAIT, CYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK PRACTICE 681 (1952).
14 56-70 58th St. Holding Corp. v. Fedders-Quigan Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 878,
160 N.E.2d 124, 188 N.Y.S.2d 995, aff'd, 6 N.Y.2d - (1959).
15 The two issues of waiver with which the case is concerned are: 1. the
tenant's alleged waiver to demand timely compliance of landlord's covenant
to obtain the certificate by sending to the landlord written notice, and 2. the
tenant's alleged waiver to demand compliance by thwarting the efforts
of the landlord by the storage of certain combustibles on the premises.
56-70 58th St. Holding Corp. v. Fedders-Quigan Corp., 5 N.Y.2d 557, 159
N.E.2d 150, 186 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1959).
16 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 825 (rev. ed. 1936).
17 3 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 16, § 825 at 2311-13.
18 Ibid.
19 Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 241-42, 129 N.E. 889, 890
(1921) (Cardozo, J.) : "Some promises are so plainly independent that they
can never by fair construction be conditions of one another. . . .Others are
so plainly dependent that they must always be conditions. Others, though
dependent and thus conditions when there is departure in point of substance,
will be viewed as independent and collateral when the departure is insignificant.
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Court felt that the covenant to obtain the certificate was independent
of the covenant to pay rent, the right to vacate becoming choate
only after the certificate had been refused and not merely delayed. 20
It can be argued that the giving of written notice was merely
the culmination of a year and a half of frustrated attempts to induce
the landlord to comply with its covenant to obtain the certificate.
2 1
Yet, it might be said that the tenant, upon giving written notice,
forgave all past noncompliance and insisted merely that the covenant
be performed within the time specified in the written notice; that
unless the parties to the contract had made time of the essence, a
mere delay should not suffice to permit rescission.22  Public policy
favors stability of contracts and seeks avoidance of unnecessary rescis-
sions as well as the concomitant loss of contractual rights.
2 3
The majority further said that the tenant "held up" the cer-
tificate by storing combustibles on the premises. The lessor had no
way of knowing that combustibles were stored because the lease
provided only for the storage of goods, and nowhere specified the
type of goods to be stored. 24 Despite this fact the tenant introduced
evidence tending to show that combustibles had been stored on the
premises from the beginning of the lease.2 5 Although the majority
may be correct in theory, it seems unlikely that the landlord of today
would not know the nature and type of goods stored on its rented
premises, and if he did not know he should have. The tenant's alleged
waiver of timely compliance with the covenant to obtain the cer-
tificate is the only issue that could conceivably have confused the
Court. Yet, the issue is so well-defined, it seems unlikely that this
was the reason for the granting of the motion.
2 6
...Considerations partly of justice and partly of presumable intention are
to tell us whether this or that promise shall be placed in one class or in
another." Ibid.
2056-70 58th St. Holding Corp. v. Fedders-Quigan Corp., 5 N.Y.2d 557,
563, 159 N.E.2d 150, 155, 186 N.Y.S2d 583, 589 (1959). Judge Fuld would
find that although the covenants were dependent, the tenant had waived his
right to demand timely compliance. Id. at 566, 159 N.E2d at 156, 186
N.Y.S.2d at 592 (concurring opinion). Cf. Taylor v. Goelet, 208 N.Y. 253,
259, 101 N.E. 867, 868 (1913) ; Lawson v. Hogan, 93 N.Y. 39 (1883).
2156-70 58th St. Holding Corp. v. Fedders-Quigan Corp., supra note 20,
at 568, 159 N.E.2d at 158, 186 N.Y.S.2d at 593 (dissenting opinion). Cf. Krausi
v. Fife, 120 App. Div. 490, 105 N.Y. Supp. 384 (2d Dep't 1907); Marks v.
Dellagio, 56 App. Div. 299, 67 N.Y. Supp. 736 (1st Dep't 1900).
22 See Lawson v. Hogan, supra note 20.
23 See Simons v. Fried, 302 N.Y. 323, 98 N.E.2d 456 (1951) ; 379 Madison
Ave., Inc. v. Stuyvesant Co., 242 App. Div. 567, 275 N.Y. Supp. 953 (1st
Dep't 1934), aff'd vinem., 268 N.Y. 576, 198 N.E. 412 (1935).
24 56-70 58th St. Holding Corp. v. Fedders-Quiglan Corp., supra note 20,
at 562, 159 N.E.2d at 154, 186 N.Y.S.2d at 588-89 (1959).
25 56-70 58th St. Holding Corp. v. Fedders-Quigan Corp., supra note 20, at
560, 159 N.E.2d at 153, 186 N.Y.S.2d at 587 (1959).
26 See note 15 supra.
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Perhaps the Court wanted a "second look" at the case and im-
plemented its desire by granting the reargument. Regardless, the
rule still stands that reargument will not, and should not, be granted
for the unique purpose of permitting the court to change its opinion.27
Concededly, if the Court were only taking a "second look," the
concept of reargument would seem to take on new meaning. The
result of this new concept might be to prolong litigation rather than
to seek its termination. The general rule, however, that reargument
should not be sought with undue optimism undoubtedly prevails,
even though the instant case could easily be read otherwise.2 8
M
TAXATION - TRANSFERRED PROPERTY HELD INCLUDIBLE IN
GROSS ESTATE WHERE GRANTOR RETAINED RIGHT TO INCOME.-
Petitioners-executors appealed from a decision of the Tax Court
which had approved inclusion in the gross estate of decedent the
value of income-producing property conveyed by him to his children
some ten years prior to his death. At the time of the conveyance it
had been orally agreed that the grantor was to retain for life the in-
come from the property. This agreement was carried out. In affirm-
ing the decision of the Tax Court, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that decedent actually enjoyed the property until death
by receipt of the income irrespective of the enforceability of any right
to it under state law. McNichol's Estate v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d
667 (3d Cir. 1959).
The case was decided under Section 811(c) (1) (B) of the 1939
Code,' presently found in Section 2036 of the 1954 Code, the Court
27 1 CARMODY-WAIT, CYCLoPEDIA OF NEw YORK PRACTicc 681 (1952).
28 COHEN & KARGER, POWERS OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS 696
(rev. ed. 1952).
1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, ch. 3, § 811, 53 Stat. 120 (now INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, § 2036), the pertinent part of which reads:
"§811. Gross Estate
The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by
including the value at the time of his death of all property, real or per-
sonal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated, except real property situ-
ated outside of the United States.
(c) Transfers in contemplation of, or taking effect at, death.
(1) General rule.
To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at
any time made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an ade-
quate and full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or
otherwise. ...
(B) under which he has retained for his life or for any period not
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